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Abstract 
 
In this article we put into question the discourses that emerged during the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) and that coalesced around a particular socio-economic imaginary of ‘recovery’ 
over the period 2009-2012. Our reading of these discourses is very much guided by the 
notion of the dialectic as developed by Fredric Jameson, and as such this paper can be read as 
attempt to put his theoretical ideas to work. Through our dialectical reading we aim to create 
a certain estrangement effect that makes the imaginary of recovery seem very odd and 
unnatural. In order to achieve such an effect we postulate four theses which are deliberately 
antagonistic: first, that there has been no ‘crisis of capitalism’; second, that we must change 
the valence of the GFC from negative to positive; third, that the relationship between finance 
capitalism and ‘free markets’ is deeply contradictory; and fourth, that we must resist the 
regulation discourse. 
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Introduction 
‘I completely understand the anger and resentment felt by the many people who have 
lost their job or faced their income being squeezed… [But] my priority today has been 
to put the economic recovery first…’ (George Osborne, UK Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, in a speech to Parliament on 9th of February 2011).  
 
In April 2012 JPMorgan Chase revealed a $3.7 billion trading loss as a result of its chief 
investment office taking a massive position in the rather obscure CDX.NA.IG.9 credit 
derivatives index. Those who believed that the notion of big credit derivative hedges going 
wrong belonged to a previous era in investment banking had clearly been wrong-footed.  But 
the event seemed to vindicate those who had argued that finance capitalism, often referred to 
as ‘Wall Street’ or ‘The City of London’, had emerged largely unscathed and unchanged 
from the Global Financial Crisis (Blackburn 2011, Engelen et al. 2011, Froud et al. 2012), 
and that it was very much again business-as-usual. This view was further bolstered with 
subsequent reported excesses in the financial sector, including the LIBOR1 scandal which 
cost both the chairman and chief executive of Barclays their jobs; the involvement in the 
laundering of Mexican drug money by HSBC; and the complicity of Standard Chartered in 
hiding $250 billion worth of transactions with Iran from US regulators. If this is the 
‘recovery’ George Osborne had in mind in his speech to the UK Parliament, it would appear 
that this ‘recovery’ deserves a closer look.  
 
An important concept in our paper is that of the socio-economic ‘imaginary’ which Gaonkar 
(2002, 1) defined as ‘an enabling but not fully explicable symbolic matrix within which a 
people imagine and act as world-making collective agents’. Jessop (2009, 344) similarly 
referred to an economic imaginary as ‘the semiotic system that gives meaning and shape to 
the economic field’. This socio-economic imaginary organizes our objective socio-economic 
conditions (Jameson 2009), and thus points to both the centrality and the indeterminacy of 
meaning and signification in our socio-economic activities (Adams et al. 2012). As Gaonkar 
(2002, 7) put it: ‘Our response to material needs, however technically impoverished, is 
always semiotically excessive. We lean on nature but are steered by the social imaginary’. 
Precisely because the totality of socio-economic activities is so unstructured and complex that 
it cannot be an object of effective calculation or governance, economic imaginaries acquire a 
crucial constitutive role as they bring into focus certain activities against the background of 
the totality of socio-economic relations. Every attempt at representation of this totality (and 
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this includes our particular attempt in this article) will be of course a mixture of success and 
failure with some features foregrounded, others neglected and possibly even misrepresented 
(Jameson 2011). The main aim of this paper is to put into question the imaginary of 
‘recovery’ which emerged post-GFC. We contend it is this imaginary which allowed the 
extensive critique of our economic system which emerged at the height of the GFC to be 
captured within the logic of capital and austerity, and thus has ended up supporting the basic 
assumptions, orders, classifications and relations that comprise market-oriented capitalism 
(Hoedemaekers et al. 2012). Morgan et al. (2011, 148) probably spoke for many critical 
scholars when they exclaimed: ‘How did we get from the politics of the financial crash, from 
the “end of the world” rhetoric of late 2008 to this? The further we get from the moment of 
most danger for the system... the more incredible it seems that some of us... actually thought 
this was a moment of profound crisis’.  
 
One can conceive of this paper as a response to the bafflement expressed by Morgan et al. 
which takes the form of a minor textual experiment; an exercise in a somewhat unusual way 
of formulating critique. In doing so we are particularly mindful of Thrift’s warning (2008, 
222) that traditional critique of our socio-economic situation has become reliant on an 
‘increasingly sterile political repertoire’ and hence has become too predictable and 
conservative. A Financial Times (FT) journalist summarised the predicament of capitalism’s 
critics rather bluntly in this respect: ‘Beating up on capitalism may satisfy old ideological 
prejudices but it does not answer the demands of voters for prosperity and fairness. The 
market’s resilience rests on a capacity to adapt. There is a lesson there for the left’ (FT 
11/06/2009, emphasis added).  We believe that a straightforward positive critique (i.e. 
suggestions for immediate actions and practical alternatives to improve things) is too easily 
appropriated and manipulated by the very forces it aims to subdue. This perennial problem of 
‘capture’ – the replication of the system of capitalism even within the thoughts and projects 
that seek to challenge it – points to the need to pay attention to not only the content but also 
the form of our critique, with the ultimate aim of developing a more ambiguous, ephemeral 
and event-related response in our writing.  
 
Perhaps as critical scholars we have been too earnest in our responses? Somehow too willing 
to believe the great myth that ‘we’re all in this together’; too readily prepared to come up 
with positive alternatives (e.g. in our desire for better, more effective regulation)? 
Furthermore, we have to be careful in our own writing that we do not usurp a space that is not 
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ours by simply providing a blueprint for others to implement, thus performing our own 
version of ‘capturing’. Thus, in structuring our paper we follow Fournier and Smith’s (2012) 
line of argument when they suggest that for critique to have any real efficacy it must have the 
force to go against the grain and to break away from norms and accepted conventions: ‘In a 
minimal sense, one could argue that critique, being oppositional, inherently involves 
antagonism and therefore threat, danger and risk’ (p.467). If critique fails to provoke and 
stand out of line it becomes ineffectual. Forslund and Bay (2009), in their agenda-setting 
paper for developing a critical finance studies, similarly suggest a ‘risky confrontation’ 
(p.285) with external powers and one’s self, a critique that ‘would cut right into and perturb 
mainstream Finance (practice, education and research)’ (p.288).  
 
In what follows we develop such a ‘confrontational’ critique through what we call a 
dialectical reading of the GFC and its aftermath. In proceeding thus we rely heavily on 
Fredric Jameson’s notion of the dialectic. We will postulate four theses, each of which aims 
to ‘go against the grain’ of received opinion and departs from the convention of careful 
critique, thus creating perhaps the impression of an almost wilful antagonism. In summary we 
posit first that there has been no ‘crisis of capitalism’; second, that we must change the 
valence of the GFC from negative to positive; third, that the relationship between finance 
capitalism and ‘free markets’ is deeply problematic; and fourth, that we must resist the 
regulation discourse. Taken as an ensemble these theses aim to unsettle and shake up the 
naturalness the imaginary of recovery has acquired and point to different horizons of 
possibility in our present condition. Our approach can thus be seen as a response to the 
realization that there are ‘landscapes of space, time and experience that have been ceded too 
readily to powerful naturalizing forces’ (Thrift 2008, 19). 
 
Introducing the Dialectic (according to Jameson) 
In developing our theses we deliberately talk about a dialectical reading and a dialectical 
consciousness, not a dialectical method or philosophy. Indeed, for Jameson (2010, 4) the 
concept of method is an example par excellence of the reified and instrumental thinking that 
dialectical thinking positions itself against. He believes that ‘the very concept of method 
flattens out all properly dialectical differences’ and in a hyperbolic turn of phrase calls the 
idea of method ‘truly vulgar’. In developing his idea of the dialectic Jameson fully 
acknowledges the importance of the thought of Hegel and Marx as a point of departure. He 
recently has devoted books to the Phenomenology of Spirit (Jameson 2010) and volume 1 of 
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Capital (Jameson 2011) in which he has challenged popularly accepted readings of the 
dialectic. He emphasizes in particular that it is more accurate to replace ‘synthesis’ with 
‘negation of the negation’ (Jameson 2011, 135) in order to avoid what he calls ‘the pseudo-
Hegelian caricature of thesis/antithesis/synthesis’ (Jameson 2009, 19).  Such a traditional 
reading, Jameson (2010, 20) suggests, does not do justice ‘to Hegel’s deeper appreciation of 
failure and contradiction and turns the historical movement of the dialectic into a banal and 
uplifting saga of inevitable progress’.  
 
Jameson traces the lineage of dialectical thinking forward through the work of Sartre – he 
completed a PhD on Sartre at Yale in 1959 and wrote the foreword to Sartre’s 
(2004) re-published Critique of Dialectical Reason – and that of Adorno, Brecht and 
Benjamin. What ultimately preoccupied all these thinkers was the necessity to provide a fresh 
perspective on our daily reality. For Adorno (2002) the dialectic is about the idea of 
potentiality, and it is just this dimension that Jameson wants to preserve amid the consensus 
as to the unsurpassable virtues of neoliberal capitalism (Kunkel 2010). It is about focusing on 
new conditions of possibility rather than outlining a specific programme for change. 
Benjamin (2002) talks in this context about the moment of awakening; the moment at which 
history emerges from the dream of a continuity between past and present, and from the dream 
that it is simply a record of progress. Benjamin wanted to actualize the past in such a way that 
it is capable of releasing a revolutionary potential in the present, bringing it into a critical 
state. It is the problem of such actualization that informs a crucial concept which he 
developed in Convolute N of the Arcades project: the dialectical image (see De Cock 2012 
for further discussion of this concept). With Benjamin the dialectical consciousness acquires 
a certain tonality that is at the the same time bright and melancholy and a content that has 
elements of both detachment and engagement (Eiland 2006). Yet it is from Brecht that 
Jameson draws the most concrete lessons regarding the dialectic. These include the Brechtian 
concept of estrangement or V(erfremdung)-effect, Brecht’s attention to the primacy of the 
situation and his claim that dialectical thinking begins with contradiction.  
 
Brecht’s V-effect was aimed at estranging and distancing people’s experience of daily life in 
the market system which they have been conditioned to think of as natural and unchanging. It 
is a way of revealing that what has been thought of as natural is in reality something quite 
different, namely historical. As Jameson has it: 
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‘What history has solidified into an illusion of stability and substantiality can now be 
dissolved again, and reconstructed, replaced, improved, 'umfunktioniert' [converted]... 
the very activity of breaking it up and 'analyzing' it is itself a joyous process, a kind of 
creative play... in which the whole reified surface of a period seemingly beyond 
history and beyond change now submits to a first ludic unbuilding...’ (1998, 47).  
The operation of the dialectic is to do something to our very sense of reality, along with that 
reality’s truths, thus making it seem very much unnatural, odd and inhuman. It should 
defamiliarize our ordinary habits of mind and make us conscious of the strangeness of reality. 
Developing such a dialectical consciousness means a ceaseless interrogating and undermining 
of received notions of narrative and historical causality, of our notions ‘of what an event is, 
how things happen, what effective causes are, how change can best be influenced’ (Jameson 
2009, 287). With reference to Sartre’s (2004) Critique of Dialectical Reason, Jameson (2009, 
50) maintains that ‘you do not think dialectically without saying so and calling it that: all of 
which is to say that you have to be grappling with a dialectical reality already in order to be 
able to show what the dialectic is’. From this follows Jameson’s insistence that dialectical 
thinking begins with contradiction; that it means observing and reconstructing situations in 
terms of contradictions. Non-dialectical thinking, on the other hand, can always be 
identified as attempts at containing, repressing or naturalizing contradictions. We can find 
such a dialectical consciousness at work in Brecht’s rhetorical procedures ‘in which items 
are rearranged with deliberation in order to bring their vectors into hostile alignment and to 
help them act out their own unique movements in such a way that the dialectic appears to be 
demonstrating itself’ (Jameson 1998, 83). Finally, Jameson follows Brecht in his insistence 
on the primacy of the situation. This means grasping the situation which confronts us in a 
way in which various heterogeneous elements of a context are unified in a contradiction or 
a question to which a response is demanded. It is about configuring our own present 
moment into a constellation in which we are able to intervene. Jameson (2009b, 247) 
elucidates using a military analogy:  
‘the commander, looking out over an uneven landscape – marshland, a few hills, a few 
roads, bad weather – suddenly, in a practiced coup d'oeil [quick glance], pulls it 
together in a strategic configuration, in which he sees either his own or the enemy's 
chances’.   
This insistence on the primacy of the situation makes it of course very difficult to codify 
the dialectic or to determine what precisely constitutes a dialectical reading.  
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Indeed throughout his writings Jameson is wary to imbue the dialectic with too much content 
as he believes we must practice dialectical thinking without allowing it to become reified. 
Even the conception of the dialectic as a system or a philosophy is in itself undialectical for 
Jameson. He came closest to formalising interrelated aspects of the dialectic in a recent 
interview (Jameson 2007), whilst being aware that the inevitable attempts at such formalisation 
would mean that ‘the dialectic, like everything else, has its own museum waiting for it’ 
(Jameson 2009, 25). These operations involve,  
‘[first] an emphasis on the logic of the situation... its primacy and the way in which it 
allows certain things to be possible and others not… [second,] the dialectic would 
certainly involve an undermining of the received forms of narrative and historical 
causality… [third,] an emphasis on contradiction... If at every moment in which we 
represent something to ourselves in a unified way we try to undo that and see the 
contradictions and multiplicities behind that particular experience, then we are thinking 
dialectically’ (Jameson 2007, 194).  
 
One further way of operationalising the dialectic is the experimentation with the valences of 
particular phenomena or discourses. For Jameson (2010) the dialectic is an injunction to 
register the negative and the positive of a given phenomenon together at one and the same 
time, and is therefore distinct from moralizing critiques and judgements. The concern with 
valences finds its roots in the Marxian union of opposites, where a phenomenon like 
capitalism is good and bad all at once and simultaneously – the most productive as well as the 
most destructive force we have so far encountered in human history. Facing this union of 
opposites may involve a ‘mixture of admiration, horror and enthusiasm’ (Jameson 2011, 54), 
similar to Marx’s sentiments when confronted with the new technologies of the capitalist 
mode of production in his time. Such a union or re-identification of opposites does not give 
us an unambiguous positive value, but rather an enlarged target of critique at a higher and 
more comprehensive level. Jameson has insisted consistently throughout his recent work on 
such an inflection in negative and positive directions of cultural, political and economic 
phenomena, no matter how noxious or thoroughly commercialised they may appear (Kunkel 
2010), with emphases varying according to the demands of circumstance and of strategy. 
As he puts it:  
‘The choice between a “good” description of capitalism (as constant revolutionizing 
and innovation) and a bad one (as exploitation and domination) is in fact a political 
choice and not a logical or scientific one: a choice that must be made in function of 
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the current situation, and whether people can be politically energized by the negative 
– anger – or the positive – hope’ (Jameson 2011, 132). 
 
A Dialectical Reading of the GFC and its aftermath 
In the remainder of our paper we will pursue our dialectical reading through an assemblage of 
opinion pieces that were published in the pages of the Financial Times (FT) over the period 
2008-2012. Together with the Wall Street Journal, the FT is very much the newspaper to 
recommend itself to the global business elite (Prichard and Mir 2010; Samman 2012)2. Since 
the readership of the FT consists to a significant extent of people with an interest in the 
financial sector, one function of the coverage of the GFC and its aftermath was clearly to 
provide some cognitive mapping to a broadly managerial audience. But publications such as 
the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal can also be seen as primary actants in 
constructing a symbolic domination over the socio-economic field. Bourdieu (2003), for 
example, identified economic journalists as the key producers of what he called ‘a symbolic 
domination without precedent’ (p.39). In arranging our FT quotes we want to encourage 
readers to see explanations and arguments put forward by the business elite and the 
journalists interacting with them in a way that is far from self evident and at times even 
contradictory. We have dated such quotes (d/m/y) in order to give the reader an historical 
perspective3. In practical terms we will provide a short montage of quotes at the start of each 
section which will frame the subsequent discussion of each of the four theses.  
 
Thesis 1: There has been no ‘Crisis of Capitalism’  
Ten months of FT editorial headlines 
‘Capitalism in Convulsion’ (19/09/2008) 
‘The End of Laissez Faire Capitalism?’ (26/09/2008) 
‘Damaging Lessons as Capitalist Model Discredited’ (29/09/2008) 
‘A Survival Plan for Global Capitalism’ (08/03/2009) 
‘Do Not Let the ‘Cure’ Destroy Capitalism’ (19/03/2009) 
‘Crisis? What Crisis? The Market Confounds the Left’ (11/06/2009) 
‘End of the World Is No Longer Nigh’ (31/07/2009) 
 
‘As a shell-shocked world tries to fathom how its economic collapse happened, 
commentators are busily outbidding each other with claims about the exceptional 
nature of this crisis’. (FT, 09/03/2009) 
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‘What about the “Future of Capitalism”, on which the Financial Times has run its 
fascinating series? It will survive... To paraphrase what people said on the death of 
kings: “Capitalism is dead; long live capitalism”.’ (FT 19/05/2009)  
 
‘Three years ago, when the worst financial and economic crisis since the 1930s 
gripped the global economy, the Financial Times published a series on “the future of 
capitalism”. Now, after a feeble recovery in the high-income countries, it has run a 
series on “capitalism in crisis”. Things seem to be worse. How is this to be 
explained?... But capitalism must still be capitalism. It is highly imperfect. Yet so are 
we. It is still a uniquely flexible, responsive and innovative economic system. It may 
be “in crisis” right now. But it is still among humanity’s most brilliant inventions.’  
(FT 23/01/2012) 
 
A dialectical consciousness, in contrast to the mainstream understanding of the ‘exceptional 
nature’ of capitalism’s crises, recognizes the continuities in capitalism and takes note of 
capitalism’s ever-expanding, crisis-generating and self-transforming modus operandi 
(Hobsbawm 2011). It is precisely the continuity in the deeper structure of the capitalist mode 
of production, rather than the ‘imperfections’ the FT refers to above, that imposes the 
experiential experience of crises on us as capitalism convulsively enlarges with each new 
phase (Jameson 2009). Failure and success are always-already dialectically intertwined in this 
particular mode of production; its expansion at one with its malfunction, its growth with its 
collapse. In other words, ‘The machine is constantly breaking down and repairing itself by 
mutation onto larger and larger scales, its past always punctually forgotten’ (Jameson 2011, 
7). Our selection of FT headlines above aims to illustrate this dynamic of crisis and 
forgetfulness over a 10-month period in somewhat poetic fashion.  
 
It is the irresolvable contradictions of capitalism, fuelling a perpetual expansion and 
accumulation, which define its essence. The GFC then is not an aberration or an exception, 
but rather the purest expression of that dynamic of capitalism which devours itself, which 
abolishes the market by means of the market itself. As such the assertions that capitalism is 
‘in crisis’ are misleading in that they seem to suggest this is an exceptional state for 
capitalism. Indeed, as we move forward in time the ‘worst financial and economic crisis since 
the 1930s’ (FT 23/01/2012) is quickly turning into a stunning victory of capital, subjecting 
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large swathes of the population in Europe to austerity and the logic of the market. This is 
particularly pertinent in the UK where we are witnessing a drastic shrinking of the public 
sector and the worst decline in real wages since the 1920s, all underpinned by the dominant 
imaginary of recovery. To extend the regal succession metaphor in the FT quote above (FT 
19/05/2009): not only does the death of the king produce a new king, it is a king who is 
more powerful and rules a bigger territory. 
 
What we have witnessed over the past few years could be accurately described as a market 
failure with devastating, yet to be fully experienced, societal effects. The ‘capitalism in crisis’ 
discourse with its associated end-of-the-world imagery which emerged at the height of the 
crisis (and which made a return in 2012 with the Euro crisis) was rather effective in 
deflecting what this crisis showed us about the integrity of public policy (Lounsbury and 
Hirsh 2010). It is thus best to regard debates on the ‘future of capitalism’ as a clever 
discursive move (a supposedly profound examination to ensure that absolutely nothing 
changes fundamentally), blinding us to the potential which the GFC offered of grasping the 
antagonistic structure of capitalism – ‘them’ vs. ‘us’ – in its pure immediacy4. This potential 
rapidly faded as the imaginary of recovery locked into place. At the January 2011 Davos 
World Economic Forum a smooth ‘business-as-usual’ discourse had become the order of the 
day again. FT journalist Gillian Tett (2011, np) observed: ‘When those delegates leave, many 
assume the event will be back next year... Davos... has assumed an air of inevitability and 
permanence; therein lies its peculiar power – canapés and all’. What the GFC allowed us to 
glimpse ever so briefly was perhaps a moment of vulnerability and arbitrariness, history as a 
process (and hence subject to human intervention) rather than the ‘great moderation’ –
effectively a locked social geology so massive that no visions of modification seem possible 
(Kunkel 2010) – which capitalism promises.  
 
Thesis 2: We must change the valence of the GFC from negative to positive 
‘While we need to clean up the present mess... it is important that we do not stop what 
is going on, just that we do it better. Otherwise, I fear the great moderation will be 
over’. (FT 22/06/2008 – emphasis added) 
 
‘The financial system has reached the point of maximum peril… After the Wall Street 
Crash, markets were deemed to have failed and US lawmakers attempted to regulate 
short-cuts through the crisis… and deepened the “Great Contraction” of 1929 to 1933. 
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The price of popular anti-market sentiment was much higher in some of Europe’s 
fledgling democracies: fascism’. (FT 25/09/2008 – emphasis added) 
 
‘The next month the slump began, and... a darkness seemed to descend. Yet... these 
years were not depressing but stimulating. One couldn’t help being exhilarated at the 
sudden unexpected collapse of that stupid gigantic fraud. It gave us a new sense of 
freedom; and it gave us a new sense of power to find ourselves still carrying on while 
the bankers, for a change, were taking a beating...’ (Wilson 1952, 498-499; 
commenting on the 1929 crash).  
 
Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the imaginary of recovery is how it disclosed the 
limits of our own imagination; the lines beyond which we do not seem able to imagine 
changes in our economy and society, except in the direction of dystopia. The first two FT 
quotes are representative of this closing of our expectation horizon. In its most extreme form 
it suggests that only a small step separates anti-market sentiment and the gas chambers. In a 
milder form it exalts the liberal ‘great moderation’, a period of sustained growth and 
prosperity driven by the progressive deregulation of markets, financial expansion and 
continued financialization (Haiven 2011). Accepting this premise can only lead to one 
outcome of course: a sullen resentment at why ‘the rigours of the market apply most brutally 
to those innocent of causing the catastrophe’ (FT 20/10/2009).  
 
Yet, we need not find ourselves ensnared in the politics of resentment. We suggest one 
important dialectical move is to change the valences of the GFC. This involves seeing 
something within our present situation which points beyond it. Marx (1959, 44) already 
proposed a conception of a new world in emergence all around us, without us necessarily 
consciously perceiving it: ‘New, higher relations of production never appear before the 
material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society.’ This 
identifying of new conditions of possibility is also something that comes through very 
strongly in Jameson’s work. He implores us to focus on ‘the shape of a Utopian future 
looming through the mist, which we must seize as an opportunity to exercise the Utopian 
imagination more fully...’ (Jameson 2009, 423). The GFC can thus serve as a thought 
experiment (or at the very least a positive visceral shock as in the Wilson quote above) where 
we try to isolate specific features in empirical events and read them as components of a 
different system. A reflection on the basic logic of our situation, pithily summarised in an FT 
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article, illustrates this move.  
‘In 1990 the 10 largest US financial institutions held about 10 per cent of US financial 
assets. Today, the number is well over 70 per cent... Dissolving a large institution will 
most likely increase financial concentration. For where will their assets end up, if not 
in the hands of the federal government, or one of the remaining giants?... Too-big-to-
fail institutions becoming essentially financial public utilities will undermine the 
efficient allocation of credit through open market trading – a centre piece of any 
capitalist system’. (FT, 16/12/2010) 
Can we inflect this reading positively as opening up multiple strategic possibilities? Can we 
somehow respond affirmatively to these developments by embracing them and pushing them 
to their limits? An obvious strategy would be to think quantity positively (in opposition to the 
dominant ‘too-big-to-fail’ scaremongering) and plan to turn financial behemoths into public 
utilities. Not that this is particularly novel idea of course. For Lenin the monopoly of the great 
banks in his historical moment ‘was not an evil but rather the possibility of a new step 
towards popular and collective control of the economy’ (Jameson 2009, 49).   
 
Ultimately a dialectical approach is not as much about offering a particular programme for 
change as it is about preserving the idea of potentiality in times of a stultifying ‘recovery’. It 
is about testing the boundaries of the sayable and the sensible (cf. Rancière 2004) through 
subtle shifts in language and imagery, and a questioning of the limits of the thinkable itself, 
something we have witnessed in the recent Occupy movement (Mitchell 2012). This was 
documented in an original way in a recent special issue of the journal Critical Inquiry and 
serves as an example to which we will return in our conclusion. From a strategic perspective 
we have to acknowledge that our opponents have proven themselves to be rather excellent 
dialecticians, effortlessly switching valences. In a recent editorial, for example, the FT deftly 
managed to re-identify Occupy as the stormtroopers of a ‘proper’ capitalism. This should 
serve as a reminder of how ‘they’ aim to capture ‘us’ in the net of a continuing symbolic 
domination: 
‘The crisis flows from a lack of capitalism where capitalism was most needed... By 
capitalism, we mean well-regulated free enterprise economies – systems where 
resources are governed mostly by the responsible choices of private individuals, 
within ground rules that are clear, consistent and immune from bias in favour of any 
special interest. Such systems best secure freedom to control one’s life, offer 
opportunities to develop one’s talents, foster responsibility for one’s choices, and 
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deliver the highest levels of material comfort in history…Encouragingly, this is also 
at the heart of what many so-called anti-capitalists want, as Occupy London’s FT 
article shows. The demands of most of the world’s indignants are better served by 
proper capitalism than by a revolution’. (FT Main Editorial 27/01/20125, emphasis 
added) 
 
Thesis 3: The relationship between finance capitalism and ‘free markets’ is deeply 
problematic 
‘Remember Friday March 14 2008: it was the day the dream of global free-market 
capitalism died. For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial 
systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve, the institution 
responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free-market 
capitalism, declared this era over... Deregulation has reached its limits.’ (FT 
25/03/2008) 
 
‘The Federal Reserve’s revelations underscore the might of unelected central bankers. 
The Treasury’s Tarp rescue fund, at $700bn, was considered so audacious that 
Congress at first refused to authorise it. But the Fed doled out no less than $3,300bn 
in loans to banks and companies without a congressional say-so…’ (FT 02/12/2010)  
 
‘Hostility to business people and capitalism has grown sharply again. Yet a world that 
is mainly capitalistic is the “only game in town” that can deliver further large 
increases in wealth and health to poor as well as rich nations. We hope our leaders do 
not deviate far from a market-oriented global economic system. To do so would risk 
damaging a system that has served us well for 30 years.’ (FT, 19/03/2009)  
 
The primacy of the situation in the ‘finance is essential’ discourse dictates the rescue of 
financial firms as a necessary, if regrettable, step for the resumption of the expansion of a 
market-driven financial system that is becoming ever more sophisticated. This discourse 
suggests that financial firms are providers of a ‘good’ that is essential to the functioning of 
the capitalist system, analogous to the relationship between ‘blood’ and ‘life’ (Harvey 2011). 
The ‘finance is essential’ discourse is about the value of finance itself, as a ‘good’ of value in 
its own right, rather than the function it serves within a broader system. Here the received 
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narrative of historical causality is underpinned by the notion of the development of 
sophisticated and efficient financial markets, free from government intervention.  
 
The explicit free market rhetoric espoused in FT editorials, especially between autumn 2008 
and spring 2009, clearly depended on the use of the image of the ‘free market’ as a symbolic 
political fantasy rather than suggesting an economic programme or even a specific 
intervention (actual interventions were anything but free-market). The GFC gave us a clear 
insight into the function of this narrative of historical causality: to defend the existing system 
of ‘free markets’ against any serious critique by legitimizing it as a direct expression of 
human nature. In a clever dialectical flip the crisis then becomes one of state spending, and 
recovery comes to depend very much on getting rid of waste; failure to do so ‘will be 
“punished” by the financial markets, once again raised to the status of omniscient and 
implacable forces of inevitable (and ultimately benign and productive) economic logics’ 
(Morgan et al. 2011,148). Frankfurter and McGoun (1999) demonstrated both the fallacy and 
the potency of the term ‘market efficiency’ in neo-liberal discourse, which really provides an 
alias for market failure: as markets are by definition efficient, failure must stem from 
interference. The undesirability of waste also provides market efficiency with a moral 
justification for organising society through markets, so that political interference is justified 
in the creation and maintenance of markets, whilst any market failure must be the product of 
unwarranted political interference. This is one of the reasons for the success of the market 
idea of course: it promises social order without institutions, claiming not to be one itself 
(Jameson 2009). Lee and Lipuma (2002, 196) point to some further interesting asymmetries 
of agentive verbal ascriptions reflecting the relationship between the third person collective 
agent of ‘the market’ and first person agents in this received narrative of historical causality: 
‘Thus, “the market” can act, indicate, warn, hesitate, climb, and fall, but is usually not able to 
take second-order verbs such as reflect, assume guilt, or take responsibility in the ways that a 
national people might’.  
 
A firm focus on the logic of the situation (as expressed in two of the FT quotes above) brings 
out an essential contradiction in the relation between the ‘free market’ and finance capital,  
namely, that the creation and maintenance of government-free financial markets involves 
enormous government intervention (Jameson 2007). Contrary to the common sense view that 
financial markets have become ever further disembedded from the state, Panitch and Konings 
(2009) describe at quite some length the expansion and consolidation of the networks of 
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institutional linkages that sustained and expanded the power of American finance over the 
past three decades. They suggest that neo-liberalism and financial expansion did not lift the 
market out of its social context, but rather embedded financial forms and principles more 
deeply in the fabric of both American society and economy. Rubotsova et al. (2010, 204), 
through their reading of Wall Street Journal articles published over many decades, explored 
the role and increasing embeddedness of the US government in what they call the ‘stock 
market logic’. They found that ‘government agencies and actors enacting legal and regulatory 
change are fully endogenous to the institutional field’. In effect, the neo-liberal turn of the 
last three decades ‘has not brought about a withering away of the state but its transformation 
on the model of the firm, to adjust itself to the new forms of capitalism’ (Boltanski 2011, 
159). Thus there exists a deeply contradictory relationship between financial firms and free 
markets, in which financial firms depend on governmental maintenance of free markets 
whilst profiting from the expansion of their own role as impediments to the way free markets 
function. This simply underscores the fact that finance capital and markets have a rather 
antithetical relationship, something which critics such as the Governor of the Bank of 
England (King 2010) have highlighted: ‘Banking crises are endemic to the market economy 
that has evolved since the Industrial Revolution… Of all the many ways of organising 
banking, the worst is the one we have today’. It is a most curious ‘free market’ indeed that 
ultimately needed $3,300 billion of public money to survive.  
 
Thesis 4: We must resist the regulation discourse 
‘A clean-up is overdue. Yet, in cleaning up, we must remember deeper truths: human 
beings will always believe what they want to; and so regulation will always fail. We 
know, too, that nothing better than the market system is on offer, however flawed. 
Financial markets fail. They are also indispensable.’ (FT 26/12/2008 – Main 
Editorial) 
 
‘Only through better discipline and more effective governance of regulators... can the 
invisible hand of Adam Smith start to work its magic once again... Personally I am 
sickened by the hypocrisy of the blame game that has been spawned by this 
wrenching crisis – a politically inspired witch-hunt that has now singled out Wall 
Street as the villain in this mess... The failure is not capitalism but the system of 
governance – or should I say, the non-governance of self-regulation – that was put in 
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place to manage the capitalist system. Fix that, and capitalism will be fine.”  (FT, 
17/03/2009 – Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia) 
 
‘One lesson from the crisis is the need for more effective systemic regulation....’ (FT 
12/10/2009 - Lloyd Blankfein, Chief Executive of Goldman Sachs) 
 
‘The neo-liberal state was a regulatory state not a laissez-faire state ... many of the old 
tunes are still with us...’ (Gamble 2009, 63–64). 
 
Drawing together our dialectical reading into a position on the current alternatives, our final 
thesis is that we have to break decisively with the ‘effective regulation’ discourse that is 
being espoused across the political spectrum, and which has become so integral to the 
imaginary of recovery. If deregulation allowed the financial markets to get out of control, 
then surely re-regulation is the way forward goes this particular discourse. An added 
ingenious right-wing twist to this, as Gowan (2009) pointed out, is the argument that the 
problem was a ‘laissez-faire’ ideology while what is needed post-crisis is ‘free-market 
thinking’, which implies some regulation. To quote an FT journalist: ‘This [GFC] was not a 
failure of markets; it was a failure to create proper markets’ (FT 15/09/2009). Or, as a 
colleague put it even more crudely in a headline: ‘Bankers have been sold short by market 
distortions’ (FT 02/06/2010). We believe this ‘common sense’ regulation argument is 
problematic at a multitude of levels.  
 
First, as we argued above, the effective regulation discourse neglects the fundamental point 
that there is no such thing as a neutral market given that market configurations are regulated 
by political decisions.  Second, the common sense view that stresses ‘effective regulation’ 
simply ignores the fundamental social and economic tensions and contradictions that have 
been produced over the course of the past few decades as financialization developed, and 
keeps developing, through both old and new regulatory bodies (Panitch and Konings 2009). 
Third, whilst the term ‘regulation’ has a connotation of fairness and neutrality, Watkins 
(2010) has unveiled its historical roots as a hard-line liberal economic concept pioneered as a 
way to manage privately owned US railroads in the 1880s. Regulation, Watkins elaborates, 
therefore has always been counterposed to nationalization and public ownership. As Stephen 
Roach and Lloyd Blankfein argued in the FT quotes above, regulation is a pre-requisite for 
the invisible hand of Adam Smith to work its magic. If we look closely at the primacy of the 
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situation in the aftermath of the GFC in the UK, we notice that senior employees of the banks 
themselves, together with City grandees, have been heavily involved in determining the new 
regulatory requirements post-crisis, thus thwarting attempts at bringing them under any 
meaningful control. This is not surprising in that they possess most of the requisite technical 
skills to translate ‘good intentions’ into practical actions. The speed with which a ‘common 
sense’ view has emerged that stresses prudent and effective regulation, and the zeal with 
which banking titans espouse the regulation agenda, arguing for greater co-ordination and 
consistency, should at the very least make us pause for thought and examine the continuity 
between actual practices before and after the GFC. Furthermore, the extensive  list of barely 
legal and illegal activities bankers engaged in that were reported over 2012, and which 
implicated virtually all major global banks, seems to indicate that senior bankers have proven 
themselves to be very good dialecticians, effortlessly discarding the law of non-contradiction 
to which we academics feel obliged to adhere. We are reminded here of Boltanski’s (2011, 
146) assessment of our elites: 
‘What members of a dominant class implicitly share, in the form of a common 
knowledge that they cannot avow to others – which they can scarcely avow to 
themselves – is, on the one hand, that it is indispensable that there should be rules – 
laws, procedures, norms, standards, regulations and so forth; and, on the other, that 
one can do nothing really profitable (translated into their language: 'really useful'), 
that one simply cannot act, in an uncertain world, if one follows these rules’.  
 
During the ‘recovery’ post-GFC power has remained fully concentrated in the hands of the 
same political and economic elites that contributed to the GFC. Marx already pointed out that 
the process of capitalist accumulation would eventually lead to an enormously concentrated 
world economy, with decision-makers only numbering a few thousand (Hobsbawm 2011). 
This is echoed in Schumpeter’s prognosis that ‘bureaucratized and collectivized modern 
capitalism would be run by networked alliances of ruling minority groups occupying key 
positions of “command and control” located at the apex of interlocking political, economic 
and cultural power structures’ (Reed 2011, 263). In this context Schneiberg and Bartley 
(2010) draw attention to the fact that elites in academia, policy and the business world all 
seem to have agreed on the natural, necessary facts with which regulatory reform must work: 
greater loss-absorbing capacity and ‘safer’ structures, but avoidance of any radical 
questioning of and changes to the purpose and structure of banking, under the motto of 
safeguarding entrepreneurship and innovation. All this points to the impossibility of effective 
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regulation; a point which, somewhat ironically, is articulated in the Financial Times editorial 
quoted at the start of this section. It notes in passing that ‘regulation always fails!’This is not 
because of some essential flaw in human nature, as the editorial seems to suggest, but 
because the demands of capital accumulation will always entice financial institutions to 
engage in ever more extreme financial innovations and a gaming of the regulations, 
something which the Governor of the Bank of England described as ‘alchemy’6.  
 
One such example of a recovered appetite for innovation, or ‘alchemy’ depending on one’s 
viewpoint, could be found in Barclays’ plan to pay bonuses in 2011 with innovative hybrids 
of debt and equity called Cocos. These ‘Contingent Convertible Capital notes’ provided 
ominous echoes of the mighty credit default swap (CDS) and collateralised debt obligation 
(CDO) efforts at financial engineering. They were described as ‘a clever way to align 
remuneration more effectively with a bank’s risks, as well as boosting capital levels’ (FT 
30/01/2011). Less sanguine commentators suggested that Cocos would actually leave 
executives ‘with a more cavalier attitude towards risk’ (FT 25/01/2011), a view supported by 
the chairman of the former Financial Services Authority who seemed persuaded that investors 
would systematically ignore the risk of conversion (Turner 2011). This was borne out a few 
months later when Barclays’s chief executive stated that the company needed to ‘increase its 
risk appetite’ in order to hit profitability targets over the next three years (FT 04/04/2011). Its 
‘daily value at risk’ metric had fallen by half since the financial crisis and was clearly 
considered too low. Cocos were key to achieving a higher return on equity as they would 
allow the bank to fund part of their capital requirements.  
 
In short, we should not see the relation between state and market in terms of deregulation as 
neoliberal nostrums keep stressing. Indeed, the need for regulation is structurally embedded 
in the logic and dynamics of contemporary capitalist accumulation. Jameson (2011, 146) put 
it pithily: ‘In a system in which the economic and the political have merged, tactics such as 
those of government regulation are mere verbal constructions and ideological rhetoric, since 
by definition their function and purpose is to help the system itself to function better’. In our 
present historical moment, the development of new regulation is simply the most efficient 
and effective way to protect firms that profit from their participation in financial markets. 
They need a regulatory framework in place to guarantee their investments, which at the same 
time they need to transgress (in spirit if not the letter) to create ‘value’ for shareholders (in 
practice this means increasing the return on equity) and thus fund their own bonuses.  
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Concluding remarks 
‘We cannot draw closed the net in which we stand’ wrote Walter Benjamin in 19217, 
explaining why he would not write an essay with the provisional title ‘Capitalism as 
Religion’. In a careful reading of the fragments of text left behind, Weber (2008) shows how 
Benjamin undertakes to develop an argument that the context, the net, does not allow itself to 
be demonstrated. We cannot draw closed the net, not because we are trapped or caught in it, 
but because we have no choice but to take our stand in the net. To provide a full-fledged 
critique of capitalism would lead us astray, ‘along an Abweg [detour] that is precisely off-
target by virtue of presenting too many targets’ (Weber 2008, 251). The very representation 
of the social totality (for which the term ‘capitalism’ is used across the political spectrum) 
remains as problematic in our current historical moment as it was for Benjamin. Yet in order 
to develop any kind of meaningful critique we still have to achieve some kind of 
representation of this totality.  
 
Rather than putting forward a traditional academic critique of financial capitalism which 
would involve some concrete proposals for change, what we have tried to do here is to put 
forward a critique that can ‘cut right into and perturb’ (Forslund and Bay 2009: 288). We 
believe that to follow a traditional approach to critique is somehow already to submit to the 
logic and discourse of the prevailing system. In contrast, by way of our four theses we aimed 
to create an estrangement effect vis-a-vis the common sense thinking about crisis and 
recovery, whilst at the same time developing a critique ‘capable of responding to the times 
with the force of historical affirmation’ (Schwarz 2007, 50). Our purpose in structuring our 
critique in this particular way was to disrupt our usual horizon of expectation, thus endowing 
our present situation, where historical process has given way to a strangely fluid stasis, with 
abilities to become other than it is. Or to put it slightly differently, we want to make the 
present thinkable again. Hoedemaekers et al. (2012, 384) talk of a ‘battle for the imagination’ 
in this context, and with a nod to Sloterdijk point to the need for hyperbolic theory, ‘theory... 
which dares to think the impossible as a possibility’. In proceeding thus we were acutely 
aware that we had to somehow create a text equal to what we are writing about. The fact that 
we have no choice but to stand in the net of capitalism requires a certain slyness and 
willingness not to be bound by the laws of non-contradiction in our writing. Jameson (1998) 
singled out this slyness as the characteristic that made Brecht such a great dialectician. He 
was a master in turning propositions inside out and opening up unexpected and unforeseeable 
 19
lines of attack. This is also what we tried to achieve with our four theses – to re-invoke 
Jameson, ‘bringing some vectors into hostile alignment and to help them act out their own 
unique movements in such a way that the dialectic appears to be demonstrating itself’ 
(Jameson 1998, 83).  
 
The recent special issue of the journal Critical Inquiry on the Occupy movement to which we 
referred earlier serves as an interesting point of reference in this context. The contributors all 
refuse ‘to speak for or to Occupy in any representative capacity’ and all ‘profess a more or 
less disobedient relation to the protocols of [their] disciplines’ (Mitchell 2012, 2). Just like 
the movement itself, the academics contributing to the issue explicitly want to test the 
boundaries of the sayable and the sensible. Taussig’s (2012) piece is of particular interest in 
that he engages in a textual experiment where form and content interpenetrate and support 
each other.  He starts his essay with a note on form:   
‘I have inserted the signs [put up by the protesters] in Zuccotti Park as if they are set-
apart quotations in the center of the page. And sometimes I have also inserted 
quotations from texts by philosophers, poets, and other people worth listening to. I 
don’t think you will confuse them, but it’s better that you do’ (p.56).  
There is an ambiguity and slipperiness to Taussig’s piece as he obstinately refuses to submit 
to the traditional mode of expression of his field whilst being acutely aware he has to find a 
form of expression and representation which somehow eludes capture by the prevailing 
system: ‘is it not the case that merely to articulate such is to sell out the movement? There is 
as yet no language to express the drift...’ (p.86). In this context it is worth reiterating how a 
thoughtful article published in the FT by Occupy London was effortlessly appropriated by the 
editorial team at the FT, changing the valences of their argument and capturing it in a 
dominant symbolic logic (see our third thesis above).  
 
Developing a certain slyness involves paying attention to the content, form and strategic 
intent of our writing with the aim of actively and provocatively striving to break with the 
dominant representations that coalesced around the imaginary of recovery. This may even 
result in a writing that may be read as flippant and not-quite-serious. It also means doing 
away with the stubborn belief in the law of non-logical contradiction and admitting that we  
critical scholars and critics of finance capitalism more generally, have been, and are being, 
thoroughly outmanoeuvred and that we simply have to become ‘smarter’. In this spirit, it is 
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perhaps appropriate to end this paper with a quote from an anonymous banker summarising 
the state of play in mid-2010.  
 ‘Hey you lent us money. We did a trade. We paid you back. When you had me down, 
you could have crushed me, you could have done whatever you wanted. You didn’t 
do it! So stop your bitching and stop telling me I owe you, because I already paid you 
everything! The fact that I’m making money now is because I’m smarter than you!’ 
(reported in the Evening Standard, 26/05/2010).  
 
Quite! 
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Notes 
 
1
 LIBOR is a benchmark interbank lending rate which forms the basis for a wide variety of 
other rates (including those of mortgages, corporate loans, and credit cards). It transpired that 
a large number of global banks had colluded in manipulation of LIBOR by misreporting the 
rate at which they could borrow from each other.  Fines handed out by the regulators in 2012 
and 2013 ran into hundreds of millions of pounds for individual banks.   
2
 Samman (2012, 216) suggests that the Financial Times (FT) and the Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ) grasped together can ‘be construed as a realm of appearance that is entirely specific to 
contemporary financialized capitalism’. In his study he detected a difference in 
representations of the 1930s that informed interpretations of the 2007-2009 crisis between the 
US and UK based publications (e.g. p.225); a split in the ‘commentariat of global finance’ 
(p.227) as it were which was not there pre-GFC. As the focus of our work is very much UK 
based (as evidenced in our use of quotes from the UK policy making elites) it made sense to 
just stick to the FT as a source in order to keep the narrative and contextual complexity to a 
manageable level (we collected FT articles which already fill 2 lever-arch files). Rubotsova et 
al. (2010) who studied the interaction of policymakers and financiers in the US only used the 
WSJ in their historical analysis for a similar reason.  
3
 When articles were authored by FT contributors or editors we simply attributed them as 
‘FT’ and dated them. FT articles that were authored by members of the business elite were 
attributed personally, as, for example, in the case of Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley.  
4
  As Jameson (2005, 37) reminds us: ‘the political is first and foremost the decision about 
friend and foe… a central and constitutive issue both in Machiavelli and in Marx and Engels’. 
5
 In the same issue (FT 27/01/2012) a rather different appropriation of Occupy as 
‘stormtroopers’ was made on the letters pages: ‘Politicisation of the economic system... was 
likewise a key feature of Nazi Germany, including wage controls and house building 
initiatives, further objectives the Occupy London thinkers also advocate’.  
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6
 In his famous ‘Bageshot’ speech Mervyn King (2010) used the word ‘alchemy’ five times. 
Its most damning use was: ‘For a society to base its financial system on alchemy is a poor 
advertisement for its rationality’. In a rare mea culpa Lloyd Blankfein admitted that ‘The 
industry let the growth and complexity in new instruments outstrip their economic and social 
utility as well as the operational capacity to manage them’ (FT 09/09/2009). 
7
 The quote is taken from the start of chapter 17 in Weber (2008, 250).   
 
 
